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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT [UTAH COURT OF APPEALS] 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to its own 
rules and case authority as follows: 
M.S., In re 012 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (10/13/89) 
[781 P.2d 1287] 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v Lamoreaux 767 P.2d 569 (UT App. 1989) 
Rule 3 "Appeals as of Right; How Taken" 
Rule 4 "Appeals as of Right; When Taken" 
Poile 22 "Computation and Enlargement of Time" 
Rule 35 "Petition for Re-Hearing" 
"...(a) Time For Filing; Answer; Oral Argument 
Not Permitted...A rehearing will not be granted in the 
absence of a petition for rehearing. A matter may not 
be reheard by the Court en banc. A petition for rehearing 
may be filed with the Clerk within 1A days after the entry 
of the decision of the Court of Appeals, unless the *" 
time is shortened or enlarged by order. The petition 
shall state with particularity the points of law or 
fact which the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked 
or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in 
support of the petition as the petitioner so desires. 
Counsel for the petitioner must certify that the 
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
Oral argument in support of the petition will not be 
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will 
be received unless requested by the Court...." 
Rule 36 "Remittitur" 
U.R.C.P. Rule 6(a) [Time-Computation] 
This Petition For Re-Hearing is based upon the fact that the 
of Appeals has overlooked its own case law Varian-Eimac, 
^ wherein it has set out that all courts are required to date 
all documents. 
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petition for Re-Hearing on Memorandum Decision of the court 
January 4, 1990 [Honorable, Gregory K. Orme; Honorable, Richard C, 
Davidson; Honorable, Regnall W. Garff] based upon Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals 4(a). Sua sponte consideration by the court 
allows no opportunity for oral argument or hearing at anytime 
herein; however, the court has ignored its own case which is 
relevant to the facts herein as follows: 
M.S., In re 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (10/13/89) 
£ [781 P.2d 1287] 
£ 
a Varian-Eimac, Inc. v Lamoreaux 767 P.2d 569 (UT App. 1989) 
m • i I , i • i - 7 .1 .Mi,, i •!., 1.11.1, • • i i H i . , . •• . I . ... . in .i n I.. H • i. . J » . . A I 
< 
-J 
< 
S STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
When an order of the court has never been filed with the 
clerk and date stamped what is procedure for determining time of 
2 appeal. 
° S 
w; 0 RELIEF SOUGHT 
t - Is 
J rt |s 
m
. » g Defendant/Appellant seeks a "re-hearing" on Memorandum 
2ts Decision based upon the decision of the court of appeals wherein 
o . • 
o >• wtz it has held that all courts are required to date stamp all 
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n 5 J documents. 
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[STATEMENT OF THE CASE] 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
(Rule 35 [Petition For Re-Hearing]) 
(Rule 27(a) [Form of Petition]) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant/Appellant by and through 
his Attorney of Record, Steven Lee Payton, and hereby petitions 
the court for hearing on dismissal order [untimely appeal] 1/4/90 
the court having not the full facts before it on points of law and 
its own cases specifying that courts must date stamp all 
documents, same being as follows: 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v Lamoreaux 767 P.2d 569 (UT App. 1989) 
Timeliness of Petition 
^
 s K Petition for re-hearing is filed pursuant to R. Ut. Ct. App. 
g< Rule 35 ffPetition For Re-Hearing" within fourteen (14) days after 
-| 2 entrv of decision of the court January 4, 1990 Memorandum 
Decision. 
Defendant/Appellant filed "Motion For Extension of Time & 
co Order" and therein pointed out that there is a variance between 
* CO 
JS ~ o the certificate of mailing and actual postmark which is by meter 
§ n *- o 
a* l0 co w therefore question of transmittal time arose. 
* 5 S ^  5 Petition In Good Faith 
|o^S 
M
 J wfcz Counsel for defendant/appellant certifies that this petition 
2 h w * 
Cy? o< J is presented in good faith, not for delay, and is based upon case 
i w J p 
2 J law set out herein. 
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Request For Oral Argument 
Oral argument is requested herein however allowable only in 
the discretion of the court pursuant to R. Ut. Ct. App. P,ule 2 
"Suspension of Rules'1 it being in the interest of justice herein 
and it appearing that the court has not applied the law as 
previously held by it to be applicable. 
Petition For Re-Hearing 
Grantsville v Bankhead 
Case No. 890638-CA 
Utah Court of Appeals 
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Date 
09/15/89 ( F r i . ) 
10/18/89 (Wed.) 
12/01/89 (Fri.) 
*ll/30/89 (Thurs.) 
12/11/89 (Mon.) 
12/15/89 (Fri.) 
12/22/89 (Fri.) 
01/04/90 (Thurs.) 
01/22/90 (Mori.) 
01/29/90 (Mon.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Description 
Edward A. Watson, Circuit Judge, Tooele 
signed ff0rder of Dismissal1'. 
Order of Dismissal record on appeal page 
125 does not show that same has never 
been date stamped in by the clerk or 
filed therewith thus constituting "entry 
of judgment11. 
Defendant filed appeal from the Order of 
Dismissal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
*Utah Court of Appeals filed Notice of Sua 
Sponte Consideration By the Court For 
Summary Disposition. 
^Certificate of Mailing 12/4/89 (Mon.) 
postmark. 
Plaintiff/Respondent postmarked 
Memorandum In Support of Summary 
Dismissal. 
Defendant/Appellant filed Motion For 
Extension of Time & Order to file 
Memorandum based upon delay in 
transmittal. 
Defendant/Appellant filed Memorandum In 
Opposition To Summary Dismissal. 
Memorandum Decision of the court 
Certificate of Mailing 1/4/90 postmarked 
1/5/90 (Fri.). 
Motion For Extension of Time & Order for 
filing Petition For F„e-Hearing to 
1/29/90 (Mon.). 
Petition For Re-Hearing filed. 
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Grantsville v Bankhead Utah Court of Appeals 
LIST OF EXHIBITS 
ADDENDUM 
Description 
Memorandum Decision 1/4/90 with envelope 
postmarked 1/5/90 
P.ecord on appeal - Trial courts Order of Dismissal 
as contained in record on appeal page 125. 
Notice of Appeal date stamped by trial court 
10/18/89 (Wed.) 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v Lamoreaux 
767 P.2d 569 (UT App. 1989) 
M.S, In Re 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 
[781 P.2d 1287 (UT App. 1989) 
State v Palmer 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 
[777 P.2d 521 (UT App. 1989) 
Calfo v D.C. Stewart Co. 717 P.2d 697 (UT 1986) 8 
West Gallery Corp. v Salt Lake City Bd. of Com'rs. 
537 P.2d 1027 (UT 1975)— 11 
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MEMORANDUM OF 
(Rule 23(3) "MoHons" [Rules Utah Court of Appeals] 
[All motions shall be accompanied by a briel 
statement of points and authorities] 
NUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I | 
^}?£ TRIAL COURT ORDER HAS NEVER BEEN DATE STAMPED BY 
T\ °< CLERK AND THUS THERE IS NO WAY FOR DETERMINATION 
3s ^ AS TO TIMELINESS OF APPEAL SINCE TIME RUNS FROM 
J S3 ENTRY [FILING]. 
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POINT 
TRIM, COURT ORDER HAS NEVER BEEN BATE STAMPED BY 
CLERK AND THUS THERE IS NO WAY FOR DETERMINATION 
AS TO TIMELINESS OF APPEAL SINCE TIME RUNS FROM 
ENTRY [FILING]. 
TIME FOR APPEAL 
Utah Court of Appeals Rules 
Rule 3(a) "Appeals as of Right; How Taken" 
"...(a) Filing appeal from final orders and 
judgments. As defined and provided by law, an appeal 
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of a 
district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the 
z Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the 
£ clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is" 
# taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an 
< appellant to take any step other than the timely filing 
< of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of 
S the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the 
Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorneys fees,..." 
Rule 4 "Appeals as of Right: When Taken" 
00 
° "• "...(a) Appeal From Final Judgment and Order. In 
£ - o case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
5 5 g from the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court 
10
 <*> « to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal required by 
fe ^  Z Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the court from 
w £5 5 which the appeal is taken within 30 days after the date 
o > * of entry of the judgment or order appealed from...." 
" t z (Emphasis Added) z o o —-t 
* < 
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COMPUTATION OF TINE 
R. Utah Ct. App. Foile 22 "Computation and Enlargement of Time" 
"...In computing any period of time prescribed by 
these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable 
statute the day of the act, event, or default from which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not 
be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period extends until 
the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, 
or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed 
or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded 
in the computation. As used in this rule, "legal 
holiday" includes days designated as holidays by the state 
and federal governments...." (Emphasis Added) 
U.R.C.P. Rule 6 [Time] 
"...(a) Computation In computing any period of 
1 z time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local 
5 j£ rules of any district court, by order of court, or by 
J < default from which the designated period of time begins CQ 
< 
CD 
UJ 
-J 
any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or 
T
to run shall not be included. The last day of the period 
so computed shall be included unless it is a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period 
runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded 
co in the computation...." (Emphasis Added) 
J? 2 o U.C.A. 68-3-7 "Time Pow Computed" 
*s* w co « "...The time in which any act provided by law is to 
^ Si 5 * be done is computed by'excluding the first day and including 
^ jjj < H g the last, unless the last is a holiday, and ttien it also 
^j | 9 >: ; is excluded. . . ." (Emphasis Added) 
°
 J
 8 t % 
| ?E S S U.C.A. 78-27-19 "Law" defined 
^ m g 
'
 w
-JH "...Where the term "law" is used in this code, it 
« j means the Utah Constitution, the Utah Code, court 
<n rules, Judicial Council rules, and decisions of the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. . . ." 
(Emphasis Added) 
* 
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*CASE INTERPRETATIONS 
M.S., In Pe 102 Utah Adv. Rep, 63 (10/13/89) t [ n i p ^ d l n j ] — 
"...@pg 64[UAR]...R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a) provides that 
a notice of appeal !fshall be filed with the clerk of the 
court from which the appeal is taken within 30 days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from". 
The judgment in the present case was filed on November 15, 
1988, and the last date on which to initiate an appeal was 
December 15, 1988. In determining whether a notice of 
appeal is timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an 
appellate court, this court must be bound by the filing 
date indicated on the notice of appeal transmitted to it 
by the trial court...." (Emphasis Added) 
£ Varian-Eimac, Inc. v Lamoreaux 767 P.2d 569 (UT App. 1989) 
< ff...@pg 571.. .Lamoreaux urges us to find an 
< exception where the filing is only one or two days late. 
L2 She claims that it is the practice of the Commission to 
allow some leeway upon substantial compliance with the 
time limits because the Commissions internal procedures 
do not insure that documents are stamped with the 
date actually received3. We reject this argument. It 
would be improper to find that sloppy office procedures 
co in some way expanded jurisdiction beyond that conferred 
§8 by the legislature....'1 
5;g lf. . .Footnote 3 @pg 571. . .Lamoreaux has included a 
OT
 OD » letter from Commission s counsel which indicates that 
In ^  w documents are not stmaped with the date actually received, 
2fc; 5 Instead the documents might be stamped a varying number 
g^2 of days afterward. We cannot consider this letter as 
w
 t z part of the record because it was not reviewed as part 
{E ^  £ of the proceedings before the Commission. However, such 
o ^  § negligence, if true, is without escuse. It is easy to 
2 J " stamp each document as it is received. All courts are 
« J required to do so and as in the instant case, the rights 
co of the parties may be determined by the time of filing..., 
(Emphasis Added) 
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COMMENTARY 
Decree of Judgment 
Even the plaintiff/respondent has acknowledged and recognized 
that the time for appeal runs from the date of entry and as set 
out in the rules of the court as follows: 
Rule 4 ffAppeals as of Right: When Taken" 
"...(a) Appeal From Final Judgment and Order. In a 
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
from the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court 
to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the court from 
which the appeal is taken within 30 days after the date 
z of entry of the judgment or order appealed from...." 
^ £ " (Emphasis Added? 
J* CO 
U CO 
CD g< It has previously been held in prior decisions that "date 
§ < 
J 2 stamp" of documents as appears therefrom is the criteria for 
determining when documents are filed. 
M.S., In re 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (10/13/89) 
— [781 p.2d m r r — — 
§8 Calfo v D.C. Stewart Co. 717 P.2d 697 (UT 1986) 
2 o 
§ 5 = 0 State v Palmer 113 Utah Adv. Pep. 40 (7/18/89) 
^ S 5 w The Utah Court of Appeals has likewise recognized in 
**** u ^  h ~ g >. LU 3 o 
•St < § >-* " Varian-Eimac, Inc., supra, the following: 
*
 J
 8 t z 
§ H u | ". . .Footnote 3 @pg 571... It is easy to stamp each 
& O < J document as it is received. All courts are required to do 
*
 w
 J S s^£ and as in the instant case~ the rights of the parties 
w !] may be determined by the time of filing...." 
w (Emphasis Added) 
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As in Varian, supra. the rights of the parties are determined 
by the filing date on the documents and this is a situation where 
Record on Appeal page 125 addendum shows clearl]/ that the document 
appealed from has never been date stamped by the clerk of the 
court thereby showing date of entry. Clearly the court has not 
complied with what the Court of Appeals has indicated is the duty 
of every court to date stamp every document. 
Question in this case involves what constitutes entry since 
the court may for a number of reasons have documents in its 
z chambers or personally holding documents, therefore the time that 
u> it is date stamped by the clerk becomes significant in determining 
< 
< rights of parties. If that is not the case then there is no 
LU 
uniform basis for measurement thereby raising a question of due 
process of law and equal protection under both the Utah 
Constitution Article I Section 7, Article I Section 12, and the 
GO 
§S Federal Constitution Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
5 5 g and Equal Protection. 00
 co « 
<n 5 w The filing date of the clerk assures all parties, defendant 
w 5 o 
g >: " and plaintiff, as to the date from which the appeal must run and 
« t z 
iEw§ it is a definite measureable date not subject to misinterpretation 
3 * w o < J 
w J
 " by anyone. 
(0 
*2 
< 
S S 
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It is basic to due process and other constitutional 
guarantees that government must follow its own rules and mandates 
West Gall 
5 
ery Corp. v Salt Lake City Bd. of ComTrs. 
37 P.2d \011 (UT 1975) 
Freeman v Centerville City 600 P.2d 1003 (UT 1979) 
Layton v Swapp 484 F. Supp. 958 (D. UT 1979) 
Parker v Cook 642 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1981) 
In this case where the Order of Dismissal has never been 
filed or date stamped in by the trial court the appeal should be 
allowed since even in In P.e M.S. , supra, that is recognized. The 
alternative remedy is that the defendant have a right to file a 
«S „ £ new appeal not later than 30 days from the date that the Order of 
<g < Dismissal is date stamped and filed by the clerk in the lower 
court and therefore the case should be remanded for said purpose 
only. 
DATED this $i 'day of 
£ ~ o . 
§ 5 = S 3tH 
O mJ _fc ^ _ 
"a* w oo ri At to rney f oirT)e fen da / i / /Appel lant 
« >. Ui 3 o 
§ 1 0 0 
5 I- u ? 
^ 3 K Si 
* < 
Steven cJLee f-^auton Kebecca <JJ. Stanton 
LAWYER "Becky" 
4 3 1 SOUTH 3 0 0 EAST, SUITE 4 0 LEGAL ASSISTANT 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-3298 
TELEPHONE (801 ) 3 6 3 - 7 0 7 0 
> 
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F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS c^crf t^cXt 
yljp&tfL/***-
00O00 
rantsville City, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
filliam Kay Bankhead, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 890638-CA 
Jefore Judges Orme, Davidson, and Garff (On Law and Motion). 
>ER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 10(e). We 
dismiss the appeal as not timely filed. R. Utah Ct. App. 4. 
William Kay Bankhead was convicted in the Grantsville 
City Justice of the Peace Court on April 13, 1988 of driving 
under the influence of alcohol and operating a vehicle without 
insurance. On June 1, 1988, Bankhead was present for 
sentencing. After Bankhead failed to comply with the sentence, 
the court advised him that a bench warrant had been issued. On 
February 22, 1989, Bankhead filed an appeal in circuit court. 
On September 15, 1989, the circuit court dismissed the appeal 
as not timely filed. Bankhead filed his notice of appeal to 
this court on October 18, 1989. 
R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a) provides that a notice of appeal 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court within thirty days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. As this court stated in In re M.S.. 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 
63, 64 (Ct. App. 1989), R. Utah Ct. App. 4(e) sets forth the 
exclusive procedure for extending the time for filing a notice 
of appeal. Further, R. Utah Ct. App. 2 precludes this court 
from suspending the requirements of Rule 4(a) or Rule 4(e) 
"except as specifically authorized by law." 
In the present case, Bankhead*s notice of appeal to this 
court was filed after the expiration of the thirty day period 
specified in Rule 4(a). Under the circumstances of this case, 
this court has no authority to deem timely the notice of appeal 
filed in this court. We therefore dismiss the appeal due to 
lack of jurisdiction. 
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heater and an electrical extension cord 
found in the mental health offices had been 
the cause of the fire. 
Within a couple of days, Stephens and 
Midgeley became concerned that a truly 
independent investigator was needed. The 
county contracted with Jim Ashby of Glob-
al Investigations for that service. Harman 
was told of the new investigator but the 
evidence is conflicting whether Tolman and 
Yearby were to continue. It is clear that 
they stopped working on the case shortly 
thereafter. 
Meanwhile, the space heater and the ex-
tension cord were sent for analysis. The 
laboratory report indicated that electrical 
current had not been present in either the 
heater or the cord when those objects 
burned. Ashby relied on this report in 
determining that the heater and cord could 
not have started the fire. He concluded 
the fire started in the roof above the men-
tal health offices. Larsen disregarded the 
laboratory report and held firm in his earli-
er conclusion that the heater and cord had 
caused the fire. 
Although both Larsen and Harman had 
been pressuring Tolman for his report, it 
was not written and submitted for approval 
until August. Both the laboratory report 
and Ashby's full investigation report pre-
ceeded Tolman's report. Tolman first sub-
mitted the report to his immediate supervi-
sor, Sam Dawson, who rejected it. Tolman 
objected and demanded that it be sent to 
Harman, who received the report and also 
rejected it. In a heated discussion, Har-
man told Tolman to write a new report. 
Tolman did so but kept a copy of the first 
report in his investigation file and also 
gave a copy to the Murray City Fire Chief, 
Wendell Coombs. Also, Harman sent a 
copy of Tolman's first report to William 
Hyde, supervisor of the county attorney's 
civil division, and possibly several others. 
In 1985, Larsen disclosed the existence of 
the first Tolman report during a deposition 
I . The fu l l icxl of § 76-8-510(1) reads: 
A person commi ts a felony of the second 
degree if, bel ieving that an of f ic ia l proceeding 
o i investigation is pending or about to be 
inst i tuted, lie: 
conducted pursuant to a civil suit over Salt 
Lake County's liability for the fire. An 
inquiry by the grand jury and this case 
followed. 
On appeal, Harman questions the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, the admission of 
certain hearsay evidence, and the refusal of 
his request for a bill of particulars. We 
find the first issue dispositive so we do not 
reach the others. 
11,2] We may review the verdict of a 
jury in a criminal case and reverse as a 
matter of law if we find the evidence i> 
insufficient. See State v. Cantu, 750 P.lid 
591, 593 (Utah 1988). However, the stan-
dard for reversal is high. "We reverse . . . 
only when the evidence . . . is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant com-
mitted the crime " State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). The weight and 
credibility to be given a witness is an exclu 
sive function of the jury. State v. Lamm. 
606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). Further-
more, all evidence and reasonable infereiv 
es drawn therefrom must be reviewed in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict 
Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. 
Although this is a high standard, it is n"t 
insurmountable. We will not make "specu 
lative leap[s] across . . . remaining gap[sj 
in the evidence. Id. at 445. Every eleinen? 
of the crime charged must be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt. If the evid'-n •• 
does not support those elements, the v.-r 
diet must fail. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70-8-510(1) (11*7-. : 
fines the crime of tampering with evid«-:, ••• 
To be guilty, an actor must have alt»-r«-: 
destroyed, concealed, or removed an iter: 
with the purpose to impair its verity • <r 
availability to a pending, or potential, off; 
cial proceeding or investigation.' A per- ? 
must have the same culpability to attrn'.;' 
to tamper with evidence. Utah ( od. A:. 
§ 76-4-101(1) (1978). 
U ) Alters, destroys, conceals, or re::. 
any th ing w i t h a purpose to impair us •< > 
avai lab i l i ty in the proceeding or mw • : . 
l i on 
4X 
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We now consider the evidence presented 
in this case in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. Harman was chief of the 
investigations division of the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office. Part of his 
duties were to review and approve or disap-
prove reports written by investigators. 
Reports could be rejected for content as 
well as form. Harman testified he thought 
Tolman's first report "parroted" Dean Lar-
sen's opinion, contained unsupported factu-
al assertions, and was a "bad report." 
Furthermore, at approximately the same 
time as Harman rejected the report, he told 
William Hyde and Lou Midgley about Tol-
man's opinion and gave a copy of the re-
port to Hyde. Hyde, in turn, told the coun-
ty commissioners about Tolman's opinion. 
Hyde and Midgley had requested the inves-
tigation in the first place and, at that time, 
were in charge of the county's defense of 
any liability claims arising from the fire. 
Copies of the report were kept in several 
files, including Hyde's case file and Tol-
man's investigative file. The documents in 
these files were available to the deputy 
county attorneys who responded to dis-
covery and Hyde produced his copy of the 
Tolman report for the grand jury. There is 
no evidence that Harman made any at-
tempt to alter, destroy or remove the re-
port from these files or to influence others 
who knew of the report. 
On the other hand, the prosecution intro-
duced evidence that Harman had said that 
the report would make the county look bad, 
cost the county millions, and make the 
county liable. 
In these circumstances, it became critical 
for the state to show that Harman's rejec-
tion of Tolman's report was improper. The 
state failed to do this. Culpability can be 
implied from the actions and statements of 
the defendant, but the evidence must be 
clear enough that the jury does not have to 
guess. We believe that the evidence of 
guilt was so slight, so conflicting, and so 
inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds could not have concluded that Har-
toan rejected the report in an attempt to 
*lter, destroy, conceal or remove it to im-
pair its verity or availability, rather than 
rejecting it because it was a 'bad report." 
We, therefore, hold that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish the required 
mental state. Since the state failed to 
prove that critical element, Harman's con-
viction is reversed. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
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OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
administrative Law Judge Gilbert A. 
irtinez denied Helen Lamoreaux's claim 
* workers' compensation benefits. The 
iustriai Commission reversed the A.L.J, 
d granted the claim. Varian-Eimac, 
:., (Varian) Lamoreaux's former employ-
appeals the Commission's ruling. 
Although the parties have argued sever-
issues before this court, one issue, that 
the timeliness of the appeal from the 
L.J. to the Commission, is dispositive. 
e will limit our discussion of the facts 
d law accordingly. 
The actual date of filing the motion for 
/iew of the A.L.J.'s denial of the claim is 
dispute. The motion was dated February 
, 1987, the last day the motion could be 
ed.1 However, the Commission's date 
imped on the motion reads February 19, 
87, two days after the due date. Varian 
ised the timeliness issue before the Com-
ission in its opposition to the motion for 
view. However, the Commission did not 
cept any evidence on the untimeliness of 
ing nor did it address the issue in its 
ling. 
Varian argues that the fifteen day time 
nit imposed by section 35-1-82.55, in ef-
ct at all pertinent times,2 was jurisdiction-
"Such motion (for review] must be filed with-
in fifteen days of the date of any order of the 
administrative law judge or commission. . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.55 (1987) (effective 
until Jan. 1. 1988). Additional days will be 
allowed when the filing is sent by mail or when 
the last day of the period falls on a weekend or 
a holiday. Utah K.Civ.P. 6. 
al and the Commission lacked authority to 
review the matter. 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power 
and authority of the court to determine a 
controversy and without which it cannot 
proceed." Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 
1230, 1232 (Utah App.1987). If a court acts 
beyond its authority those acts are null and 
void. Id. Therefore, the initial inquiry of 
any court should always be to determine 
whether the requested action is within its 
jurisdiction. When a matter is outside the 
court's jurisdiction it retains only the au-
thority to dismiss the action. Id. The 
sources of jurisdictional limits may vary 
according to the type of court involved 
However, it is basic that "the jurisdictional 
limits of a statutorily created court . . . are 
circumscribed by its empowering legisla-
tion." Id It follows that the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial adminis-
trative agency, such as the Industrial Com 
mission, which is a statutory creation. 
would also be "fixed by statute." Rether 
ford v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 739 
P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App.1987). Just as any 
court, the Commission should first (h.>wr 
mine that it has jurisdiction and, if it does 
not, dismiss the matter. Any action be 
yond its jurisdiction is void. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.55 (19871 re 
quired a motion for review of an A.L.J.'s 
order to be filed with the Commission with-
in fifteen days. If this requirement wa.-
not met "said order shall become the a war: 
of the commission and shall be final." !•• 
The statute uses the word "shall" and -<• ^ 
mandatory. Therefore, the Commis.-'.•>?• -
jurisdiction is terminated once the t.;;:.-' 
time limit has been exceeded. 
Such an interpretation is consistent wj:r. 
Utah appellate court decisions on similar 
time limits. In Watson v. Anderson. '-4 
2. After the Commission proceedings and -' " 
mencement of this appeal, this section v-*»v : ' 
pealed. Currently, the statutes do not p r e - : ' ' 
a specific time limit within which review f"-
Commission must be sought. Instead. (<-," 
bility for setting the appropriate procedure .»• 
tune limits lor the filing of motions (•" "'• 
is delegated lo the Commission. See I t-«i- ( " ' 
Ann. § 35-1-82.53 (1988) 
Ol 
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Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973) the Utah panded by waiver or consent. Thompson, 
Supreme Court determined that failure to 
file an appeal within the required time limit 
deprived the court of subject matter juris-
diction. The court emphasized this princi-
ple in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984): 
"It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that 
failure to timely perfect an appeal is a 
jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of 
the appeal." In an action closely related to 
the one before us, this court found that it 
was without jurisdiction to review a deci-
sion of the Industrial Commission when the 
applicable time limit had been exceeded. 
Retherford, 739 P.2d at 80. Finally, in 
Thiessens v. Department of Emp. Sec, 
663 P.2d 72, 73 (Utah 1983), the supreme 
court noted that another related time limit 
for appeals to the Commission was proba-
bly jurisdictional. 
Lamoreaux urges us to find an exception 
where the filing is only one or two days 
late. She claims that it is the practice of 
the Commission to allow some leeway upon 
substantial compliance with the time limits 
because the Commission's internal proce-
dures do not insure that documents are 
stamped with the date actually received.3 
We reject this argument. It would be 
improper to find that sloppy office proce-
dures in some way expanded jurisdiction 
beyond that conferred by the legislature. 
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be ex-
3. l-amoreaux has included a letter from Com 
mission's counsel which indicates that doc 
umenis are not stamped with the date actually 
received. Instead the documents might be 
stamped a varying number of days afterward, 
^ c cannot consider this letter as part of the 
record because it was not reviewed as part of 
743 P.2d at 1232. "The issue is not one of 
the actual practice of the Industrial Com-
mission, but one of jurisdiction as pre-
scribed by the workers' compensation stat-
utes." Ring v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 
P.2d 602, 603 (Utah App.1987). 
Accordingly, we hold that the statutory 
time limit formerly imposed on filing ap-
peals from the orders of A.L.J.s to the 
Commission was jurisdictional. Since no 
evidence was taken or considered by the 
Commission on the timeliness of the filing, 
we remand for a factual determination of 
whether Lamoreaux's motion was filed 
within the statutory time limit. Depending 
upon that determination, the Commission 
must either dismiss or return the case to 
this court. In either case, findings should 
be made. 
We reverse and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. We retain 
jurisdiction pending the Commission's pro-
ceedings. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., 
concur. 
/ * ^ —^  
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the proceedings before the Commission. How-
ever, such negligence, if true, is without excuse. 
It is easy to stamp each document as it is re-
ceived. All courts are required to do so and, as 
in the instant case, the rights of the parties may 
be determined bv the time of filing. 
64 M.S. 102 una , In re Adv. Rep. 63 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court pursuant to R. 
Utah Ct. App. 10(e) on its own motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction based on an untimely 
notice of appeal. The appeal is from a judgment 
of the Fourth District Juvenile Court for Utah 
County filed on November 15, 1988. This court 
received a certified copy of the notice of appeal 
on December 27, 1988, which was accompanied 
by a letter from appellant's counsel addressed to 
the Clerk of the Fourth District Juvenile Court 
and dated December 19, 1988. The notice of 
appeal was stamped "Filed December 20, 1988. 
Juvenile Court, Fourth District.' The letter was 
stamped as •Received* on December 20, 1988, by 
the Fourth District Juvenile Court. 
This court served a Notice of Sua Sponte 
Consideration by the Court for Summary Dispo-
sition on the parties. Appellant filed a Memora-
ndum in Opposition to Summary Dismissal of 
Appeal. The state filed a responsive memorandum 
in which it suggests that the case be remanded to 
the Fourth District Juvenile Court for determin-
ation whether an order should be entered purs-
uant to R. Utah Ct. App. 4(e) extending the time 
for filing the appeal. We remand the case to the 
trial court for the purposes of making such a 
determination. 
Appellant advises this court that the notice of 
appeal was, through mistake or inadvertence, 
incorrectly filed with the Fourth Judicial District 
Court rather than the Fourth District Juvenile 
Court. Appellant states the notice was mailed on 
December 13, 1988, to the Utah County Clerk 
marked "Attention: Juvenile Section.* On Dece-
mber 14, 1988. the Utah County Clerk returned 
the original notice of appeal to appellant's 
counsel accompanied by two notes. One note 
indicated the correct address for the Fourth Jud-
icial District Court and the other slated: 
December 14, 1988 
Incorrectly sent to Utah County 
Clerk's Office. Should be sent to: 
Fourth Juvenile Court 
2021 South State 
Provo.UT 84601 
This information is available on 
page 134 of the 1987-88 Utah State 
Bar directory. You will be able to find 
most, if not ail, addresses in this dir-
ectory. 
Utah County Clerk's Office 
Appellant notes that the "Utah County Clerk's 
Office, rather than transmit the notice of appeal 
to the Juvenile Court, mailed the original notice 
of appeal back' to appellant's counsel. Appel-
lant's counsel states that he received the original 
notice of appeal on December 16, 1988. He also 
indicates that on December 16, a clerk of the 
Fourth District Juvenile Court advised him by 
telephone that the juvenile court had received a 
copy of the notice of appeal and if a letter of 
explanation was sent, "it would be called to the 
Court's attention for a determination as to 
whether the Notice of Appeal would be consid-
ered timely filed.* This explanation is apparently 
contained in the December 19, 1988, letter, a copy 
of which was transmitted to this court. The notice 
of appeal certified to this court, however, is 
stamped as filed on December 20, 1988, five days 
after the expiration of the appeals period. 
R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a) provides that a notice of 
appeal 'shall be filed with the clerk of the court 
from which the appeal is taken within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from." The judgment in the present case 
was filed on November 15. 1988. and the last date 
on which to initiate an appeal was December 15, 
1988. In determining whether a notice of appeal is 
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an 
appellate court, this court must be bound by the 
filing date indicated on the notice of appeal tra-
nsmitted to it by the trial court. This requirement 
is implicit in provisions of our rules governing 
timeliness of an appeal. R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a) 
requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 
thirty days with 'the clerk of the court from 
which the appeal.is taken.* In addition, R. Utah 
Ct. App. 4(e) states the exclusive procedure for 
extending the rime for filing a notice of appeal: 
The court from which the appeal is 
taken, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days 
after the expiration of the time presc-
ribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. A 
motion to extend time that is filed 
before expiration of the prescribed 
time may be heard ex parte unless the 
court from which the appeal u taken 
requires otherwise. Notice of any such 
motion that is filed after the expira-
tion of the prescribed time shall be 
given to the other parties in accord-
ance with the rules of practice of the 
court from which the appeal is taken. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time or 101 days from 
the date of the entry ofl the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs 
later. i 
R. Utah Ct. App. 4(e) (Emphasis added). R. Utah 
Ct. App. 2 specifically precludes this court from 
suspending the requirements or provisions of 
either Rule 4(a) or Rule 4(e), and R. Utah Ct. 
App. 22(b) precludes this court from extending 
the time for filing a notice of appeal 'except as 
specifically authorized by law." Under the circu-
mstances of the present case, this court has no 
authority to deem timely a notice of appeal that is 
not indicated by the trial court to be timely, nor 
can this court consider a motion to extend the 
time for appeal. ' 
Appellant makes several arguments in support 
of its contention that the notice of appeal was 
either timely filed or deemed timely filed by the 
juvenile court. First, appellant argues that the 
filing with the Utah County Clerk was timely and 
"the Utah County Clerk transmitted a copy of it 
directly to the Juvenile Court." Second, appellant 
claims that the notice of appeal was deemed 
timely filed because if it had not been, the clerk 
would have so advised counsel. Finally, appellant 
argues that if the juvenile court had not found the 
appeal was timely filed, the notice of appeal 
would not have been filed with this court. For the 
reasons stated below, none of the foregoing arg-
uments has merit. 
As to the first contention, we conclude that the 
fiUng with the Utah County Clerk docs not con-
stitute a timely filing with the juvenile court. 
There is no indication when the Utah County 
Clerk transmitted a copy of the notice of appeal 
to the juvenile court, and the original was retu-
rned to appellant's counsel. The record in this 
appeal reflects that the notice of appeal was 
"filed" in the juvenile court on December 20, 
1988, five days after the expiration of the time for 
appeal. 
Appellant also argues that the appeal was 
deemed timely based on the fact that the juvenile 
court did not notify counsel otherwise, and alte-
rnatively, based on the fact that the juvenile court 
transmitted the notice of appeal to the Utah court 
of appeals. If the procedures for initiating an 
appeal set forth in our rules are to have any pra-
ctical significance, a determination of timeliness 
cannot be presumed or inferred from actions of 
the trial court. The juvenile court's purpose in 
transmitting a copy of counsel's letter of Dece-
mber 19 to the court of appeals is not clear. If the 
letter was considered to be a motion to extend the 
time for initiating an appeal, it must be ruled on 
by the juvenile court under R. Utah Ct. App. 
4(e). Similarly, if transmittal of the letter was 
intended as an indication to this court that the 
trial court determined the appeal to have been 
timely received, that determination should be 
specifically indicated by an order of the trial court 
or by the date of filing stamped on the notice of 
appeal. 
Under the particular circumstances of this case, 
including a specific request of the state to remand 
the case for determination of timeliness, we do 
not dismiss the appeal at this time. The case is 
temporarily remanded to the Fourth District 
Juvenile Court in order to allow that court to 
make a determination whether an order extending 
the time for appeal should be entered by the 
juvenile court under R. Utah Ct. App. 4(e). If the 
juvenile court declines to extend the time for 
appeal, the appeal will be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction upon notice to this court of the entry 
of such an order. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench. Judge 
Richard C. Davidson. Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
in*a n aw** 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
rE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ! 
v. 
y PALMER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
890312-CA 
890358-CA 
ID. July 18, 1989 
d District, Salt Lake County 
orable John A. Rokich 
ORNEYS: 
es A. Valdez, Salt Lake City, for 
ppellant 
>aul Van Dam, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt 
ike City, for Respondent 
>re Judges Jackson, Orme, and Garff (On 
and Motion). 
OPINION 
I CURIAM: 
his matter is before the court on its own 
ion pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 10 for 
unary dismissal because the notice of 
eal was not timely Tiled in the trial court, 
s court served its Notice of Sua Sponte 
isideration By The Court For Summary 
position, and the defendant filed a Mem-
ndum In Opposition to Sua Sponte 
nmary Dismissal of Appeal. We dismiss the 
>eal for lack of jurisdiction. 
The trial court entered its judgment on 
cember 19, 1988. Defendant prepared a 
ice of appeal, which he apparently mailed 
or about January 16, 1989. The notice of 
;>eal was filed in the district court on Febr-
ry 3, 1989, more than thirty days after entry 
the judgment being appealed.1 
Defendant does not dispute the foregoing, 
t urges this court to "accept jurisdiction" 
d hear the appeal. Defendant makes two 
guments against dismissal. First, he contends 
it this court should interpret its rules "so as 
consider a Notice of Appeal to be timely 
lien is placed in the prison mail by an inc-
cerated criminal defendant within the thirty-
iy period set forth in R. Utah Ct. App. 4." 
cond, defendant urges that, if untimely, the 
ipeal should be remanded to the district 
>urt for entry of an order extending the time 
ir appeal. 
We conclude that the notice of appeal was 
:>t timet* filed under any plausible interpre-
lion^KlDur rules. R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a) 
provides that a notice of appeal "shall be filed 
with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken within 30 days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from.* R. Utah Ct. App. 2 specifically precl-
udes this court from extending the time for 
filing a notice of appeal provided in Rule 4(a), 
and R. Utah Ct. App. 22(b) precludes this 
court from extending the time for filing a 
notice of appeal "except as specifically auth-
orized by law." In State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 
36, 37 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the 30-day period for filing a notice 
of appeal in a criminal case is jurisdictional 
and cannot be enlarged by an appellate court. 
R. Utah Ct. App. 4(e) clarifies that the proc-
edure for extending the time for appeal is by a 
motion to the trial court. Similarly, Stare v. 
Johnson, held that a convicted defendant's 
claim he has been denied his constitutional 
right to an appeal should be presented to the 
sentencing court pursuant to a motion for post-
conviction relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 6SB(i). 
635 P.2d at 38. Thus, the determination 
whether an untimely criminal appeal may 
proceed is reserved to the trial court by app-
ellate rule and case law. 
Defendant urges this court to interpret its 
rules to consider a notice of appeal to be 
timely filed where it is place in the prison mail 
by an incarcerated criminal defendant within 
the thirty-day period set forth in R. Utah Ct. 
App, 4. Rule 4(e) provides that a notice of 
appeal must be "filed" with the trial court. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the asser-
tion that filing was complete upon mailing to 
the trial court. Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 
849 (Utah 1983). Similarly, in State in re: 
M.S., 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (Utah App. 
1989), this court concluded that an appellate 
court is bound by the filing date stamped on 
the notice of appeal by the trial court. To hold 
that filing in the trial court is complete upon 
mailing is inconsistent with R. Utah Ct. App. 
4(a). Application of a three-day mailing rule 
is inappropriate on the same grounds and also 
on the basis that the notice must be filed 
within thirty days of the judgment's entry, 
and not of its service "by mail" on the defe-
ndant within the meaning of R. Utah Ct. App. 
22(d). 
Defendant also urges this court to remand 
the case to the trial court for entry of an order 
extending the lime for appeal, relying upon 
Stare in re: M.S., 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 64. 
In that case, an appellant filed the notice of 
appeal in the trial court along with letter 
explaining the late filing. The letter and the 
notice of appeal were transmitted to this 
court, without any disposition by the trial 
court of the issues raised in the letter. The 
trial court stamped the notice of appeal as 
filed on a date that made the appeal untimely. 
The appeal was temporarily remanded to the 
trial court pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 4(e) 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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for a determination (1) whether the letter 
would be deemed a motion to extend the time 
to file and (2) if so, whether an extension 
would be granted. There was no filing in the 
trial court in this case that may be considered 
a timely motion for extension. 
The notice of appeal in No. 890312-CA 
was not timely filed and did not confer juris-
diction on this court. The notice of appeal in 
No. 890358-CA was also untimely. The 
appeals are dismissed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. After appointment of counsel on appeal, counsel 
filed an additional notice of appeal from the same 
judgment which has been docketed as a separate 
appeal in the Utah Supreme Court and poured over 
to the Court of Appeals as our No. 890358-CA. 
Our disposition of this appeal is also dispositive of 
No. 890358-CA which was not filed until March 
16, 1989. 
Fourth District, Utah County 
Honorable Boyd L. Park 
ATTORNEYS: 
Don R. Petersen, Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, 
for Appellants 
Stephen L. Henriod, Marilynn P. Fincshriber, 
Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood, and 
Orme. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ORME, Judge: 
Our opinion in this matter issued on June 
20, 1989. See Mountain States Broadcasting 
Co. v. Neale, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Ct. 
App. 1989). Mountain States seeks our reco-
nsideration of the attorney fees issue, partic-
ularly our conclusion that it was not the 
'prevailing party* in proceedings before the 
district court. Although the petition for rehe-
aring is otherwise without merit and is denied, 
Mountain States identifies an oversimplifica-
tion in our opinion which merits comment and 
clarification. 
The thrust of Mountain States' petition is 
that it must be held the prevailing party since 
it only claimed all along that it was entitled to 
some offset, in an amount to be proven, and 
ultimately proved it was entitled to an offset. 
Conversely, Mountain States argues, NBA was 
the loser because it contended no offset was in 
order and it was proven wrong. Mountain 
States suggests that the absurdity of our reli-
ance on the "net judgment" rule in a case like 
this is shown by the fact that if it had proven 
offsets totalling even SI.00 less than the 
amount otherwise due under the note, despite 
a near-total victory for Mountain States the 
net judgment would still be in favor of NBA 
and strict application of the net judgment rule 
would leave NBA the prevailing party. 
Mountain States' point is well-taken. On 
the other hand, carrying its own position to an 
equivalent extreme works an equally untenable 
result: If Mountain States had shown its ent-
itlement to an offset of only $1.00, under its 
view it would be the prevailing party since it 
claimed an offset in an amount to be proven 
and proved one. 
We recognized in footnote 7 of our opinion 
and here emphasize "the need for a flexible 
and reasoned approach to deciding in partic-
ular cases who actually is the prevailing 
party." Consistent with that view, we point 
out that nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to suggest that the net judgment rule 
can be mechanically applied in all cases, alt-
hough it will usually be at least a good starting 
point. 
In this case, we remain convinced that 
application of the net judgment rule does not 
distort the relative success of the parties at 
trial, as seen from two additional perspectives 
implicit in Mountain States' petition.1 
Taking a narrower focus, the real dispute 
centered on the $30,000 held in court after the 
initial disbursement to NBA. Mountain States 
fought long and hard to show that it was 
entitled to at least that amount in offsets. 
NBA claimed it was entitled to the entire 
fund, pursuant to its note, since Mountain 
States was not entitled to any offset. Total 
victory for Mountain States would have been 
its proving entitlement to all $30,000. Total 
victory for NBA would have been its proving 
Mountain States was entitled to nothing. A 
"draw" would have been a decision dividing 
the $30,000 equally. As it happened, $6,000 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MOUNTAIN STATES BROADCASTING 
COMPANY, a corporation, and Dan Lacy, an 
Individual, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants and Cross-
Respondents, 
v. 
Sterrett NEALE and Neale Broadcast 
Alliance, 
Defendants, Respondents and Cross-
Appellants. 
No. 880192-CA 
FILED: July 20, 1989 
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2. Criminal Law <s=»394.4(12), 1169.1(8) 
Admission of drugs seized from vehicle 
violated Fourth Amendment and was re-
versible error in trial for possession of con-
trolled substances and possession with in-
tent to distribute, where officers had no 
reasonable, legitimate basis, statutory or 
circumstantial, for impounding defendant's 
vehicle prior to search. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4; U.C.A.1953, 41-1-115, 41-6-
116,10, 58-37-3. 
G. Fred Metos, Ronald J. Yengich, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Sandra Sjogren, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of pos-
session of controlled substances and pos-
session with the intent to distribute. He 
was also convicted of driving with a sus-
pended driver's license, but he does not 
appeal that conviction. He urges that the 
irug convictions should be reversed be-
cause the drugs admitted into evidence 
>vere unlawfully seized in a warrantless 
search of his truck, impounded at the time 
)f his arrest. 
County sheriffs officers had previously 
iuspected defendant of drug dealing, but 
lad insufficient cause for either an arrest 
>r a search warrant. Aware that defend-
mt's driver's license was suspended, the 
officers staked out the home of defendant's 
larents for the purpose of stopping defend-
,nt as he drove to their home. 
When stopped by the officers, defendant 
ulled over and parked his truck off of the 
treet in an office parking lot. He was 
hen arrested for driving with a suspended 
cense. The officers refused to permit him 
> leave his locked truck in the parking lot 
r to allow it to be retrieved by his parents, 
ho lived only four blocks away. Instead, 
n officer drove the truck to the police 
lation and there privately conducted an 
lventory search, during which time the 
rugs were found and seized. 
U.C.A.. 1953, as amended . 
00 
U) We have previously held that an 
inventory search is improper when conduct-
ed "only as a pretext concealing an investi-
gatory police motive," e.g., to obtain evi-
dence in place of a full-blown investigative 
search. State v. Hygh, Utah, 711 P.2d 264, 
268 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364, 376, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 
3100, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). "In order to 
support a finding that a valid inventory 
search has taken place, the court must first 
determine whether there was reasonable 
and proper justification for the impound-
ment of the vehicle." 711 P.2d at 268. 
There was no statutory authorization for 
detention of the vehicle under sections 58-
37-3, 41-6-116.10, or 41-1-115,' as in State 
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (1986). Absent a 
statutory basis justifying impoundment, we 
look to the totality of the surrounding cir-
cumstances to determine the reasonable-
ness of the seizure of the vehicle. 
12J Cache County has no written stan-
dards or procedures for police impound-
ment of motor vehicles. It is undisputed 
that defendant's truck was safely locked 
and parked in a parking lot behind a law 
office. There is no evidence that there the 
vehicle posed any danger to the officers or 
the public. Defendant was not permitted 
to have someone pick up his locked truck 
from the parking lot or to arrange other 
disposition. Defendant was neither ad-
vised of the search in advance nor allowed 
an opportunity to be present. 711 P.2d at 
208-69. 
In its responding brief, the State con-
cedes the invalidity of the search in this 
case because the officers had no reason-
able, legitimate basis, statutory or circum-
stantial, for impounding defendant's ve-
hicle prior to its search. The purpose of 
the impound was to further the investiga-
tion of defendant's suspected drug activi-
ties by creating a pretext for a custodial 
search. Consequently, the drugs were il-
legally seized, and the resulting convictions 
should be reversed. 
CALFO v. D.C. 
Cite as 717 P 2d 
Because the impoundment and search 
were admittedly a pretext concealing an 
investigatory police motive, the evidence 
seized was improperly admitted at trial un-
der the fourth amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 711 P.2d at 270. We 
again note that neither party has discussed 
or applied article I, section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution to the facts of the in-
stant case, and therefore, we do not here 
consider any separate state standards. See 
State v. Earl, supra. 
Defendant's convictions of possession 
and possession with the intent to distribute 
controlled substances are reversed and re-
manded. 
STEWART CO. Utah 6 9 7 
697 (Utah 1986) 
appeal did not begin to run until entry of 
order stating that summary judgment was 
properly signed and entered, and (2) prom-
issory note stating that note was due in full 
upon final closing between promissor and 
buyers, which would be on or before cer-
tain date, when buyers would exercise their 
option to purchase motel, was not nego-
tiable instrument. 
Reversed and remanded with di-
rections. 
Angelo CALFO, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
D.C. STEWART CO., Clara J. DeC.raff. 
dba C J . Realty and Roland Vance, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 19309. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 28, 1986. 
Holder brought action against promis-
sor, realtor and realtor's agent, as guaran-
tor, upon promissory note issued by prom-
issor to realtor and sold to holder by real-
tor's agent. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, David B. Dee, J., entered 
summary judgment for holder and granted 
promissor indemnity against realtor and re-
altor's agent, and upon promissor's motion 
to strike, entered order eliminating interest 
and stating that summary judgment was 
properly signed and entered and in full 
force and effect, and promissor appealed 
from such order. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, J., held that: (1) time for taking 
1. Appeal and Error <s^347(2) 
Time for taking appeal from judgment 
did not begin to run until entry of order 
stating that previous summary judgment 
was properly signed and entered and in full 
force and effect, where form of prior sum-
mary judgment had not been served upon 
defendant prior to submission to trial court, 
as required by local rule. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 58A(c); Rule 73(a) (Repealed). 
2. Bills and Notes ©=>144 
To be negotiable under Uniform Com-
mercial Code, instrument must evidence 
signature by maker or drawer, contain un-
conditional promise or order to pay sum 
certain in money, be payable on demand or 
at definite time and be payable to order or 
to bearer. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C.A.1953, 
70A-3-104. 
3. Bills and Notes e=*144 
To qualify as negotiable instrument 
under Uniform Commercial Code, promise 
to pay and certainty of payment must be 
unequivocal. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C.A. 
1953, 70A-3-104. 
4. Bills and Notes <2=144 
Instrument's negotiability must be de-
terminable from what appears on face of 
instrument, without reference to extrinsic 
facts. U.C.C. §§ 3-104(1), 3-105 comment; 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-3-104. 
5. Bills and Notes ^ l l t 
Purpose of requirement that instru-
ment's negotiability be determinable from 
what appears on face of instrument is to 
9 8 I'tah 717 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
rotect transferees from latent defenses to 
lyment. U.C.C. § 3-104(1). 
Bills and Notes e=312 
Transferee is not entitled to insulation 
om apparent defenses where negotiable 
strument evinces terms which should 
ert transferee of possible defenses. 
.C.C. §§ 3-104(1), 3-105 comment; U.C.A. 
)53, 70A-3-104. 
Bills and Notes €=161 
Promissory note issued by seller to 
laltor, stating that note was due in full 
son final closing between seller and buy-
's, which would be on or before certain 
ite, when buyers would exercise option to 
archase motel, was conditional and indefi-
te on its face, and thus, was not nego-
able instrument. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C. 
.1953, 70A-3-104. 
Bills and Notes c=452(l), 452(3) 
Promissor's defenses of lack of consid-
'iition, nonmaturity of note, and failure of 
mdition precedent were absolute in hold-
•'s action upon promissory note, issued by 
•omissor to realtor and sold to holder by 
*ent of realtor, stating that note was due 
full upon final closing between promis-
>r and buyers, which would be on or be-
>re certain date, when buyers would exer-
se their option to purchase motel, where 
ile of motel did not occur. U.C.C. 
} 3-104(1), 3-302(1); U.C.A. 1953, 70A-3-
)4. 
Michael R. Carlston, Salt Lake City, for 
Pendants and appellants. 
Joseph H. Galiegos, Michael K. Sciurnba-
>, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
-nt. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case involves a suit by plaintiff An-
elo Calfo upon a promissory note issued 
y defendant D.C. Stewart Co. ("Stewart"), 
he note was payable to the order of C.J. 
ealty and was sold to Calfo by an agent 
f C.J. Realty. The trial court granted 
alfo a summary judgment enforcing the 
ote. Stewart appealed. We hold that the 
CO 
note was not a negotiable instrument and 
reverse the trial court on that ground. 
Stewart owned the Astro Motel in Cedar 
City, Utah. Defendant Roland Vance, a 
real estate agent for defendant C.J. Realty, 
approached Stewart about listing the motel 
for sale with C.J. Realty. The listing 
agreement was entered into, and Vance 
subsequently obtained a potential buyer for 
the motel. 
On September 24, 1979, Stewart and the 
potential buyer entered into a lease agree-
ment and option to purchase. The agree-
ment provided that the lessees could exer-
cise an option to purchase the motel on or 
before May 1, 1980. Also on September 24, 
1979, Stewart executed a promissory note 
for $15,900 payable to C.J. Realty to secure 
the real estate commission to which C.J. 
Realty would be entitled if the lessees exer-
cised their option to purchase. The promis-
sory note provided that it would be payable 
as follows: 
Total due in full upon final closing be-
tween D.C. Stewart Co., Seller, and Wen-
dell James Downward and Connie Down-
ward, husband and wife, Buyers, which 
shall be on or before May 1, 1980, when 
Buyers exercise their option to purchase 
the Astro Motel in Cedar City, Utah. 
On September 27, 1979, the promissory 
note was sold by Vance, acting on behalf of 
C.J. Realty, to the plaintiff Calfo for $12,-
720. 
The lessees never exercised their option 
to purchase the Astro Motel. However, 
after May 1, 1980, Calfo made demand 
upon all of the defendants for payment of 
the note. When payment was not forth-
coming, suit was brought on the note 
against Stewart, and against Vance as 
guarantor of the note. Stewart then cross-
claimed against his co-defendants for in-
demnity. 
On January 5, 1982, the trial court heard 
Calfo's motion for summary judgment. 
Calfo argued that the promissory note was 
a negotiable instrument on its face, that it 
was past due, and that he was a holder in 
due course. On that same date, the court 
CALFO v. D.C. 
Cite as 717 P^d 
also heard Stewart's motion for a summary 
judgment. Stewart asserted that the note 
was not a negotiable instrument and that 
Calfo was not a holder in due course. In 
addition, Stewart's counsel represented 
that if a judgment was granted against 
Stewart, counsel for Stewart's co-defend-
ants had consented to entry of judgment on 
Stewart's cross-claim for any amounts it 
was required to pay Calfo. The trial court 
orally granted Calfo's motion. In so doing, 
it found the note to be "a good note." The 
court denied Stewart's motion against Cal-
fo, but allowed Stewart indemnity against 
its co-defendants. 
[1] On January 14, 1982, the trial court 
executed a document entitled "Summary 
Judgment" which awarded Calfo the princi-
pal amount of the note $15,900, plus inter-
est at six percent per annum from the due 
date, and attorney fees of $2,700. Stewart 
first became aware of this document in 
May of 1982, when Calfo attempted to col-
lect upon it by instituting supplemental 
proceedings. Stewart's counsel complained 
to Calfo's counsel that the form of judg-
ment had not been served upon him prior to 
its submission to the trial court, as re-
quired by Rule 2.9(b) of the District and 
Circuit Court Rules of Practice for the 
State of Utah. Efforts to have Calfo's 
counsel voluntarily withdraw the summary 
judgment failed. Stewart then moved the 
trial court to strike the judgment, arguing 
that the judgment improperly allowed in-
terest and that it had not been submitted to 
opposing counsel for approval prior to sub-
mission to the court. 
After a series of hearings on Stewart's 
motion to strike, the trial court executed an 
order on June 7, 1983, stating that "the 
summary judgment entered by the court on 
January 14, 1982 . . . was properly signed 
and entered by the court on said date and 
is in full force and effect. . . . " However, 
the court's June 7th order did modify the 
1. Rule 73(a) was superseded on January 1. 1985, 
by Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Appellate 1'ioce-
dure. All relevant developments in this case 
occurred under Rule 73(a), although the holding 
STEWART CO. Utah (,99 
697 (Utah 1986) 
earlier order by deleting the award of inter-
est. 
Stewart appeals from the order of June 
7, 1983. Calfo objects to the timeliness of 
the appeal, arguing that the June 7th order 
merely confirmed the judgment entered on 
January 14, 1982, albeit as redrawn to elim-
inate interest; therefore, the time to appeal 
expired one month after January 14, 1982, 
not one month after June 7, 1983. Rule 
73(a), Utah R.Civ.P.1 
The appeal was timely taken. We have 
previously held that unless Rule 2.9(b) of 
the District and Circuit Court Rules of 
Practice has been complied with, the judg-
ment in question is not deemed "filed" 
within the meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the time 
for taking an appeal from that judgment 
under Rule 73(a) [now Rule 4(a) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure] does not be-
gin to run because the judgment has not 
been properly "entered." Bigelow v. In-
gersoll, Utah, 618 P.2d 50, 52 (1980); Lar 
sen v. Larsen, Utah, 674 P.2d 116, 117 
(1983); Wayne Garff Construction Co., 
Inc. v. Richards, Utah, 706 P.2d 1065, 1066 
(1985). Because Rule 2.9(b) was not com-
plied with here, there was no judgment 
from which an appeal could be taken until 
June 7, 1983. Stewart's appeal from the 
order entered on that date is timely. 
[2] Reaching the merits, Stewart ar-
gues that trial court erred in finding the 
promissory note to be a negotiable instru-
ment. To be negotiable under section 3-
104(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-3-104 (Repl.Vol. 7B, 
1980), an instrument must meet four crite-
ria. Specifically, it must (i) evidence a sig-
nature by the maker or drawer, (ii) contain 
an unconditional promise or order to pay a 
sum certain in money, (iii) be payable on 
demand or at a definite time, and (iv) be 
payable to order or to bearer. Stewart and 
Calfo agree that the promissory note in 
question satisfies the first and fourth of 
ul this case with respect to when a judgment is 
"filed" is equally applicable under the new Rule 
4(a). 
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ese requirements. They disagree as to 
hether second and third are met. 
|3] Although the second and third re-
tirements of negotiability are separately 
a ted, in fact they are closely related. 
jth focus on whether the instrument is a 
?ar and unconditional promise to pay. 
lese concerns are central to the whole 
ncept of negotiable instruments and that 
ould be kept in mind in determining 
tether a document is entitled to be treat-
as a negotiable instrument under the 
liform Commercial Code. Two important 
actions of negotiable instruments are "to 
pplement the supply of currency" and to 
>vide a present representation of "future 
yment of money." 1 W. Hawkland, A 
ansactional Guide to the Uniform 
m me trial Code § 2.0304, at 459 (1964). 
These currency and credit functions 
•vould be defeated by conditional prom-
ses. because the costly and time consum-
ng investigations that would be required 
jy such promises would impede circula-
ion. Conditional paper would increase 
he risks of the holder, and discount 
•ates would be increased comrnensurate-
y. Substitutes for money must be capa-
>le of rapid circulation at minimum risks, 
md credit documents are feasible only 
vhen low discounting prevails. Obvious-
y, then, negotiable instruments must be 
ineonditional to serve the purposes for 
vhich they are created. 
Because a negotiable instrument is a 
jstitute for money or currency, both the 
irnise to pay and the certainty of pay-
nt must be unequivocal. 
Mi] For similar reasons, an instru-
nt's negotiability must be determinable 
m what appears on its face and without 
erence to extrinsic facts. See Part id-
fing Parts Associates, Inc. v. Pylatit, 
i.Civ.App., 460 So.2d 1299, 1301 (1984); 
Isonback i\ First State Bank, A la.Civ. 
p., 394 So.2d 3*1, 383 (1980), cert, de-
d, Ala., 394 So.2d 384 (1981). See also 
icial Comments to I'.C.C § 3-105. 
s requirement protects transferees from 
-ntl^y^-nses l o payment, i.e., those de-
se.-yjjjich are not readily apparent from 
the document. 5 Anderson, Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 3-104:4 (3d ed. 1984) (rely-
ing upon First State Bank v. Clark, 91 
N.M. 117, 570 P.2d 1144, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 
§ 1186 (1977)). On the other hand, if the 
document evinces terms which should alert 
the transferee of possible defenses, then 
the transferee is not entitled to insulation 
from those apparent defenses. 
The whole purpose of the concept of a 
negotiable instrument under Article 3 is 
to declare that transferees in the ordi-
nary course of business are only to be 
held liable for information appearing in 
the instrument itself and will not be ex-
pected to know of any limitations on ne-
gotiability, or changes of terms, etc., con-
tained in any separate documents. The 
whole idea of the facilitation of easy 
transfer of notes and instruments re-
quires that a transferee be able to trust 
what the instrument says, and be able to 
determine the validity of the note and its 
negotiability from the language in the 
note itself. 
First State Bank v. Clark, 91 N.M. 117, 
570 P.2d 1144, 1147 (1977). 
[7] The present case involves a promis-
sory note which is "due in full upon final 
closing between . . . seller and .. . buyers, 
which shall be on or before May 1, 1980, 
when buyers exercise their option to pur-
chase the Astro M o t e l . . . " In determin-
ing whether this promise to pay is condi-
tional or indefinite, we are not aided by the 
trial court's summary finding that this is a 
"good note." The document specifically 
states that it is due only upon final closing 
"when buyers exercise their option to pur-
chase." This language clearly places the 
holder on notice that the note will become 
due only upon a contingency which the 
holder cannot control, i.e., the exercise by 
buyers of their option to purchase. As for 
definiteness, the date set forth, May 1, 
1980, merely defines when the option to 
purchase expires and does not establish a 
time as to when the note will certainly 
become due. On these facts, we find the 
note to be both conditional and indefinite 
on its face. 
IN RE DISCIPLINARY ACTION OF McCUNE 
Cite as 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986) 
Calfo relies upon the case of Northwest-
ern National Bank of Minneapolis v. 
Shuster, Minn., 307 N.W.2d 767 (1981), in 
support of his argument that language in 
the promissory note does not make the 
obligation to pay conditional. We find this 
unpersuasive. In Shuster, the promissory 
note contained language that "[t]his is 
promised payment for ownership in Casper 
project [when] option is exercised for 2nd 
half." Id. at 770. The Shuster court 
found that this reference to an option did 
not create a conditional promise to pay. 
However, it ultimately held that the quoted 
language prevented the holder from being 
a "holder in due course" under section 3 -
302(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code 
because it placed the holder on notice as to 
a defense against payment based upon fail-
ure of a condition precedent if the option 
there was not exercised. Id. at 771. The 
holdings in Shuster—that the note is un-
conditional but that it gave the holder no-
tice of defenses—appear to be inconsistent. 
The better reasoning would be that the 
note was conditional and therefore non-ne-
gotiable. See, e.g., Participating Parts 
Associates, Inc. v. Pylant, Ala., 460 So.2d 
1299, 1301-02 (1984). 
Utah 701 
In re DISCIPLINARY ACTION OF 
George McCUNE. 
No. 20140. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 31, 1986. 
Disciplinary proceeding was instituted. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that 
counsel, who retained out-of-state attorney 
to represent client and engaged court re-
porter to transcribe depositions in a case, 
was subject to disciplinary sanctions, includ-
ing reimbursement as condition to reinstate-
ment, for failure to pay for the reporter's 
and other counsel's services, where those 
amounts were billed to the clients, who paid 
counsel. 
Suspension ordered. 
Howe, J., filed concurring statement, 
in which Zimmerman, J., joined. 
{81 For the reasons stated, we hold that 
the promissory note sued upon is not a 
negotiable instrument and that judgment 
was improperly entered against Stewart. 
There appears to be no dispute in the 
record that the sale of the Astro Motel did 
not occur. Stewart's defenses of lack of 
consideration, non-maturity of the note, 
and failure of condition precedent seem to 
be absolute. We therefore remand the 
case for entry of a judgment in favor of 
Stewart on its motion for summary judg-
ment, and for such further proceedings 
against the other defendants as are appro-
priate under the pleadings, and as are con-
sistent with this opinion. Consistent with 
Rule 33(a), Utah R.App.P., costs are award-
ed to appellant. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWL, and 
DURHAM, J J., concur. 
1. Attorney and Client ©=»52 
Counsel's failure to answer formal 
complaint issued by ethics and discipline 
committee panel constituted an admission 
of charges that he had failed to pay out-of-
state attorney whom he had engaged to 
represent client and certified court reporter 
which had been engaged to transcribe dep-
ositions in one of counsel's cases. 
2. Attorney and Client c=»36( 1) 
Supreme Court's power to regulate 
practice of law necessarily includes the 
power to discipline a lawyer. Const. Art. 8, 
§§ 1 et seq., 4. 
3. Attorney and Client <^36( 1 > 
Legislature's power to regulate and 
control attorneys in certain aspects is sub-
ject to Supreme Court's inherent power to 
discipline its officers. Const. Art. 8, §§ 1 
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control or possession of Bank and the 
proceeds of such property. 
Defendant filed its financing statement 
with the Secretary of State on December 
6, 1972. On July 30, 1973, the plaintiff en-
tered into a security agreement with Nu-
clear Controls and Electronics Corporation 
(hereinafter called Nuclear) which covered 
all of Nuclear's inventory, work in process, 
raw materials, and stock in trade, and all 
after acquired inventory and any proceeds 
rising therefrom.1 On July 30, 1973, the 
plaintiff and Nuclear entered into a securi-
ty agreement which covered the revolving 
accounts receivable of Nuclear. Financing 
statements were duly filed by the plaintiff 
with the Secretary of State. 
The Trans-Atlas Corporation was the 
parent corporation of both Nuclear and 
Summit. Nuclear was engaged in manu-
facturing calculators and other electronic 
equipment. Summit was engaged in the 
marketing of the products. In September, 
1973, the Board of Directors of Trans-At-
las Corporation authorized Nuclear and 
Summit to effect an intercompany sale of 
all assets of Nuclear to Summit. The in-
tercompany transfer of inventory and as-
sets was made on the books of both corpo-
rations as of January 1, 1974. The 
transfer of assets was a bookkeeping en-
try and without consideration. As of the 
date of the transfer of assets Summit had 
accounts receivable in the amount of more 
than $2,000,000. During January, !<>74, the 
plaintiff and the defendant learned of the 
transfer of assets from Nuclear to Summit. 
As of the time of the transfer of assets 
Nuclear was indebted to the plaintiff in 
the sum of $831,770, and thereafter Sum-
mit and the plaintiff had several discus-
sions concerning that indebtedness. On 
February 12, 1974, Summit gave to the 
plaintiff a promissory note in the amount 
of the indebtedness secured by a financing 
agreement which granted to the plaintiff a 
security interest in raw materials and other 
1. 7<)A 0 2 0 3 ( 1 ) (1»), I ' . ( \ A. 1 !*.r>3. 
2. fl!P& 310, (J.C.A.1903. 
assets including finished products, the per-
tinent language is as follows: 
Raw materials, parts and work in 
process involved in assembly of electron-
ic calculators; as well as the finished 
goods inventory of calculators held for 
sale to customers. 
All collateral covered hereunder, espe-
cially cash and noncash proceeds (includ-
ing chattel papers and accounts receiva-
ble) is subordinate to and the terms and 
conditions set forth in paragraphs 2-9 
are limited in application by a prior and 
superior security interest in accounts re-
ceivable held by Zions First National 
Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
As further security, Summit granted to the 
plaintiff a security interest in its accounts 
receivable which instrument contained the 
following provision: 
All collateral assigned to secured party 
hereunder and all terms and conditions 
hereof are subordinate to and limited by 
the security interest in accounts receiva-
ble presently held by Zions First Nation-
al Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
[1,2] In determining the priorities as 
between the parties, it is quite clear that 
the defendant's security interests in Sum-
mit's accounts receivable take precedence 
over any interest of the plaintiff, and that 
fact is recognized by the plaintiff by the 
language contained in its security 
agreements- with Summit above referred 
to. As to the transfer of the inventory 
from Nuclear to Summit, plaintiff retained 
its security interest in the transferred 
assets.3 The security interest of plaintiff 
in the transferred assets was not extin-
guished by the plaintiff taking a new 
promissory note procured by the security 
agreements entered on February 12, 1974. 
The transferred assets not being subject to 
the defendant's security interest, the new 
security agreement entered into on Febru-
ary 12, 1974, does not have the effect of 
3. 70A-«-Wn, T.C.A.11*53; 70A-9-315, l.C.A. 
15)53; Intermountuin Association of Credit 
Men v. The Villager, Inc., ftah., 5J7 P.2d 
604. 
WEST GALLERY CORP. v. SALT LAKE CITY BD. OF COM'RS 
Cite as 537 P.2d 1027 
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subordinating the plaintiff's interest in the 
transferred assets. 
[3,4] The record before this court does 
not support the claim of the defendant that 
the plaintiff is estopped to claim a priority 
over the defendant. Also in view of the 
fact that Nuclear was engaged in manufac-
turing rather than the sale of merchandise, 
the transfer of assets from Nuclear to 
Summit was not a bulk transfer as contem-
plated by Section 70A-6-102. 
[5] We are of the opinion that a sum-
mary judgment should not have been en-
tered and that evidence should have been 
taken, and the plaintiff should have been 
accorded the opportunity to trace, if it can, 
the assets and proceeds which went to de-
fendant subject to the plaintiff's security 
interests. It appears also that a question 
of fact exists as to the accounts receivable 
in which the defendant had a security in-
terest prior in time to that of the plaintiff. 
This matter is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings in conformi-
ty with this opinion. Appellant is entitled 
to costs. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
ELLETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur. 
WEST GALLERY CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, dba Gallery I Theatre, et 
al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF COMMIS-
SIONERS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 13963. 
Supreme ('ourt of lTtah. 
July 10, 1075. 
Action was brought by corporation op-
erating a cinema against board of city 
commissioners. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
J., enjoined city commission from proceed-
ing further in the matter of revocation of 
corporation's license to do business until 
related criminal action pending against 
corporation had been concluded, and board 
of commissioners appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Henriod, C. J., held that city, hav-
ing passed ordinances which set up a fact-
finding citizens' committee to determine 
existence of obscenity before a license 
could be revoked, could not deviate from 
the ordinance by instituting proceeding, be-
fore conclusion of criminal action, to show 
cause why license to do business should not 
be revoked. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., concurred in result. 
Crockett, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion in which Ellett, J., joined. 
1. Theaters and Shows C=>3 
City which passed ordinances estab-
lishing a fact-finding citizens' committee to 
determine existence of obscenity before re-
voking a license could not deviate from 
procedures established in the ordinances, 
after filing criminal complaint against cor-
poration operating a cinema, by instituting 
proceeding, before conclusion of the crimi-
nal action, to show cause why corporation's 
license should not be revoked. 
2. Injunction C=>83 
District court, which enjoined city 
commission from further proceedings 
against corporation in relation to revoca-
tion of corporation's license to do business 
before criminal action, pending against 
corporation had been concluded, did not 
improperly interrupt a legislative power 
and an administrative hearing, where city 
failed to follow procedures, set forth in 
city ordinance establishing a fact-finding 
commission to determine existence of ob-
scenity before a license may be revoked, in 
that it filed criminal complaint against cor-
poration ordering corporation to show 
cause why its license to do business should 
not be revoked before criminal action 
against corporation was concluded. 
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Koger V. Cutler, Salt Lake City Atty., 
Ray L. Montgomery, Asst. City Atty., Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
Gerald II. Kinghorn and Bruce C. Lu-
beck, of Kinghorn, Oberhansly & O'Con-
nell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and re-
spondents. 
HKNRIOD, Chief Justice: 
Appeal from an order granted by the 
lower court enjoining the City Commission 
from "further proceedings until the related 
crirrinal action pending against plaintiffs 
have been concluded in City Court." Af-
firmed. 
Plaintiffs operated a cinema house in 
which they showed, for a price, a flicker 
that allegedly appealed to one's prurient, 
japeless sensitivity, according to the U.S. 
Supreme Court's conception. There were 
neighborhood complaints about the films, 
which, substantiated by City peace officers' 
statements and others who saw them, hard-
ly could have represented any watchword 
documentary dedicated to decency or any 
Hallmark card deifying virtue. 
With this scenario, the City (after filing 
i criminal complaint against them) ordered 
he purveyors of these visual aids, on a 
lay certain, to show cause, if any there be, 
,vhy their license to do business should not 
)C buried. 
The City based its interdiction on an or-
linance which the Commission had passed 
followed by a rather precipitous repealer) 
laming the deviations from decency, 
vhich, if accomplished, well might result in 
rime, chaos, charge, possible penalty, and 
onceivablc institutional penal servitude. 
Really, it had to do with the hoped-for de-
use of the turnstiles employed by the tick-
t-buying biological curious. 
[1] The order which the City says is 
ffensive (constitutionally, because of sep-
ration of powers concepts), to proper leg-
>lative and administrative decor, succinctly 
*id: 
1) That the City, having passed Salt 
ake C|uyh>rdinances, Sees. 20-2(1-18.1, es-
to 
tablishing a fact finding citizens' commit-
tee to determine before a license revoca-
tion that obscenity "cannot 'deviate' there-
from in making or attempting to make 
such a determination." 
That should be dispositive here. The 
City hardly can claim it could proceed and 
convict someone without following its own 
procedural requirements. It is conceded 
that the City did not follow its own legisla-
tive pronouncement,—and the District 
Court having pointed this out in its order, 
together with the admission of the City of 
its accuracy,—adds up to one inescapable 
conclusion,—that the City as a conse-
quence, could not proceed in violation 
thereof, and that the writ issued here was 
apropos,—and that the City's looking 
askance at that part of the Court's order 
because it became moot by virtue of the 
ordinance's subsequent revocation, doesn't 
justify its espousal of an attack on the 
writ for some other reason, i. e., 
[2] 2) That the District Court was in 
error because it interrupted a legislative 
power and an administrative hearing. 
The suggestion of mootness on the part 
of the City is mute evidence that it has at-
tempted to shift its own abortive proce-
dures onto the shoulders of the District 
Court, justification enough for the issu-
ance of the writ. The City is not hydra-
headed enough as to say it must determine 
obscenity by a prescribed procedure which 
admittedly it failed to pursue in order to 
dclicense one, but simultaneously can pun-
ish one for obscenity under some other 
procedure. 
The City's argument seems to be a study 
in inconsistency. It seems to say that 
someone didn't do the thing right because . 
we didn't do it right, and now we wish to 
right our wrong by saying that our wrong 
was a circumstance that does not justify 
the District Court in saying it was wrong, 
but, on the contrary, that we have some 
sort of Constitutional right to prevent a 
Court of Law from saying our wrong was 
not a protectable constitutional right. 
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an excusable neglect ogre plaintiff's license should not be revoked. 
determination is properly within 
Somehow 
somehow, somewhere, looms large in the 
wings, to be identified by the City in a de-
vious attempt to detour a couple of funda-
mentals. 
If it be any comfort to the City, wherein 
its second point on appeal is asserted, to 
which we subscribe, that: 
The District Court has no power to re-
view the action of the "commissioners until 
after their final action has been taken," we 
simply say that if the Commission has not 
exceeded, circumvented or ignored its con-
ceded legislative prerogative, and has fol-
lowed its constitutional tri-partite privi-
leges under its constitutional authority,— 
gospelly, it is right,—but here,—the City 
wants us to say that the Judiciary has no 
right to interfere with another branch of 
government,—even though the latter is 
afield in its presumed, but unrespected un-
due process contention of governmental in-
dividualism, impregnability and isolation, 
—and we agree with the City, but not its 
action of inconsistency. 
We think that except under the circum-
stances of this case, no one justifiably 
could say that the City could not pursue a 
course of conduct designed to examine 
facts justifying the granting of, the contin-
uation of or the revocation of a business 
license for cause,—and at the same time 
pursue an action against someone for an 
alleged infraction of the law. 
TUCKETT,J.,o 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the result. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I am unable to concur with the affirm-
ance of the judgment. It is my opinion 
that the appellant Salt Lake City is entitled 
to have an adjudication of this case on the 
basis of the order entered by the district 
court at the time it was entered; and it is 
further my opinion that the order made 
and appealed from was both ill advised and 
beyond the proper prerogatives of that 
court. 
The proceeding before the City Commis-
sion involved the question as to why the 
Such 
both the duty and the prerogative of the 
City Commission, which it should have 
been not only permitted, but encouraged to 
discharge with dispatch. This, for the 
benefit of all concerned, including the pub-
lic. I know of no justification whatsoever 
for the district court to enter an order 
staying the action of the City Commission 
until the criminal proceedings had been 
completed. 
Three points are noted: First, whether 
the licenses should or should not be re-
voked was not necessarily dependent on the 
outcome of the criminal proceedings; Sec-
ond, the burden of proof in the criminal 
proceedings is different from the unrelated 
proceeding before the City Commission; 
and Third, the criminal proceedings, for 
various reasons, and perhaps by appeal or 
otherwise, may well be delayed and pro-
tracted and thus unjustifiably delay the 
Commission from performing its duty. 
ELLETT, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of CROCKETT, J. 
S5J> 
M. L. SEARS et al., Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
OGDEN CITY, a body politic, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 13647. 
Sui>rciiu» Court of Utah. 
July 11, 1075. 
Appeal from Third District Court, Weber 
County; John E. Wahlquist, Judge. 
Pete N. Vlahos of Vlahos & Gale, Og-
den, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
L. Kent Backman, Ogden City Atty., Og-
den, for defendants and respondents. 
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